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then we propose two others postulates to round out the Freudian 
paradigm: (3) the unconscious processes are goal directed; and 
(4) the unconscious processes are conflicting. In conclusion we 
propose that current experimental and theoretical works reveal 
that the opposition between Freudian and cognitive unconscious 
rests on a methodological misunderstanding.
First postulate: some psychological processes are 
unconsciously perFormed and they causally 
determine conscious processes
One of the first and most persistent criticisms of Freud is that 
the existence of unconscious representations is self-contradictory. 
More recently, functionalism has articulated claims that are struc-
turally homologous to Freud’s, according to which cognition is a 
sub-personal computation of internal representations. Some phi-
losophers still object to such talk, on the basis of the supposition 
that representation is by nature conscious (Searle, 1992). Recently, 
psychologists (Greenwald, 1992; Loftus and Klinger, 1992) have 
posed this question in terms of whether the unconscious is smart 
or dumb. In other words, the question of whether unconscious 
processes can be said to be psychological depends on what extent 
they are as “intelligent” as conscious ones. In this section we aim 
to review the principal works showing that unconscious pro-
cesses are neither “dumb,” nor limited to primitive or weak forms 
of cognition.
the richness oF the smart unconscious
The philosopher Dennett claims that psychological representations 
are not mental entities coded in cognitive or biological systems 
(Dennett, 1987). They refer to psychological descriptions cuing 
biological regulation traits, which are not psychological per se. 
Shevrin and Dickman (1980) bites the bullet and proposes that: 
introduction
Since Freud’s time psychoanalysts have allowed a major gap to grow 
between psychoanalysis and other scientific approaches. The fol-
lowing discussion is representative of a larger pattern in the (non) 
dialog between psychoanalysis and neuro-biology: Edelman (1992), 
in Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, described the conversation he used to 
have with Jacques Monod on Freud. The latter used to claim being 
entirely aware of his motives: “and entirely responsible for [its] 
actions. They are all conscious.” Edelman, an admiring of Freud’s, 
once responded to him in exasperation, “Jacques, let’s put it this 
way. Everything that Freud said applies to me, and none of it to you.”
Both Edelman and Jacob are materialists, at least naturalists. 
Does it mean that for them, the existence of the Freudian uncon-
scious depends on the opinion we have on Freud’s theories and not 
on facts? Moreover, if the two biologists share a more or less similar 
brain, can they have two different kinds of unconscious; among 
which only one (the cognitive one) is scientifically observable? The 
aim of this article is to review out the empirical and theoretical 
convergences between the two fields pleading in favor of a common 
and objective representation of unconscious processes (see Table 1).
Some researchers have already attempted to consider Freudian 
hypotheses at the light of cognitive science and neuroscience 
(Figure 1). Among them, Shevrin and Dickman (1980), in a seminal 
paper, started out from the common consensus that defines uncon-
scious processes are (1) psychological events that are unknown to 
the patient but that actively affect its behavior, and adduced empiri-
cal data in favor of the more challenging Freudian postulate that (2) 
unconscious processes are ruled by specific laws of organization. We 
find this strategy – which take the basic Freudian postulates as sug-
gestions to progressively define and evaluate unconscious life – to be 
extremely helpful. Thus, along the same lines, we first review cogni-
tive and neuroscience data in favor of the first two  postulates, and 
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“by psychological we mean simply that all categories of descrip-
tive terminology applicable to conscious experience can also be 
applied to unconscious processes.” Such a statement is consistent 
with Dennett’s criticism of realistic psychology, and in line with the 
central tenet of Freud’s epistemology (Arminjon, 2010). As a matter 
of fact we have only indirect experience of a psychological uncon-
scious, inferred from overt behaviors. Obviously, it has been one of 
the most promising Freudian contributions to talk about, at least 
heuristically, unconscious “perceptions,” “judgments,” “affects,” and 
so forth. But the question now is whether those heuristic concepts, 
applied to the unconscious, are consistent with neurocognitive data.
Brain imaging has shown that many subliminal stimuli acti-
vate brain regions without the subject being able to report those 
influences. For example, Whalen et al. (1998) presented pictures 
of human faces bearing fearful or happy expressions that were 
sequenced 33 ms before neutral faces that backward masked 
the face. Respondents were then asked about the human facial 
expressions and did not report seeing the fearful or happy faces. 
Nevertheless, the emotionally charged human faces triggered the 
subject’s amygdalae. Hence, there is reason to think that affective 
stimuli can cause effects on the subliminal level, and certain stimuli 
– say, fearful faces – are more intensely received than other ones. 
This in itself indicates some primitive hierarchizing organization. 
But how complex is that organization? Are emotional effects too 
simple for unconscious processes to be called smart, that is, to make 
discriminations based on an autonomously produced structure?
The study of patients with brain damage has brought out evi-
dence about even more complex unconscious processes. Patients 
with damage to primary visual cortex are able to make accurate 
pointing movements toward object they report not seeing. The 
classic research of Goodale and Milner (1992) has reported that 
while blind sight subjects consciously express impairment in find-
ing and seeing mobile slots, they still succeed in posting a card in it. 
Hence, unconscious visual perception is able not only to deal with 
basic one-dimensional images, but also with three-dimensional 
data like shape, orientation, size, etc. These results are in line with 
the hypothesis of two visual neural pathways by Ungerleider and 
Mishkin (1982): the ventral one processing conscious representa-
tions allowing object identification and the dorsal one, uncon-
sciously analyzing the visual field in a pragmatic way.
The work of Goodale and Milner and the two visual pathways 
hypothesis not only show the material mechanism by which uncon-
scious processing of complex representations occurs, but do so in 
maintaining a clear-cut distinction between upper and higher pro-
cessing levels. Marshall and Halligan (1988) have proceeded fur-
ther in the realm of higher-level processing. They chose for their 
experiment a patient who suffered from lesions on the right side of 
the brain, which was expressed in unilateral neglect, a condition in 
which the patient turns away from, forgets or ignores objects in the 
contralesional space. To test the cognitive processing of unimpaired 
sensorimotor inputs, a patient with unilateral neglect was presented 
with two line drawings of a house, one above the other. Sometimes 
they were identical, and sometimes one of the houses was on fire. 
When the flames came from the right hand side of the house, she 
correctly identified whether the pictures were the same or different. 
When the flames came from the left hand side of the house, however 
the other house was not on fire, she identified them as the same. 
However, when asked which house she would prefer to live in, 80% 
of the time, she chose the house that was not on fire, even though 
she judged them to be the same1. These answers seem to show an 
“unconscious awareness” of the sensory data she received through 
her healthy ventral pathway and primary cortex. Two conclusions 
can be drawn. First, these findings suggest that the ventral path-
way’s complex representational faculties could be processed uncon-
sciously. Second, it seems that the differences between unconscious 
and conscious processes are not strictly determined by anatomical 
and hierarchical reasons. Thus, from the functional point of view, the 
richness of unconscious processes may stem from their capacities to 
perform the tasks usually taken as necessitating consciousness. The 
latter conclusion contrasts with the claim, based upon the evolution 
of brain development, according to which “intelligent” conscious 
processes probably are based on such recent brain arrangements 
as the forebrain, while unconscious ones might take place within 
primitive structures as the brainstem. We will see in Sections “Third 
Postulate: Unconscious Intentions or Goal-directed Unconscious 
Processes” and “Fourth Postulate: Conflict as a Cause of Psychic 
(Auto)Organization” how the automatic/controlled dichotomy is 
another formulation of the primitive-poor/recent-rich opposition.
unconscious causal inFluence on conscious processes
Postulating the existence of unconscious processes supposes admit-
ting psychic continuity and determinism. It means that psychologi-
cal discontinuities – displayed by symptoms, parapraxes, gaps, and 
so forth – can be explained by unconscious causes. As Shevrin et al. 
(1996) puts it: “anything properly described as psychological can 
potentially provide psychological explanations and causes.” So, to 
be considered as psychological, unconscious representations might 
have intentional (at least intentional-like) effects on conscious cog-
nition. Since Stroop’s (1935) paper about interference in serial ver-
bal reactions, we know that unconscious semantic processing does 
interfere with overt semantic tasks. If subjects are asked to say the 
color of words as faster as they can, for instance saying red when the 
presented word “blue” is painted in red, responses are slower when 
Figure 1 | relationship between latency and duration for highest and 
lowest frequencies by word category. (Left) Unconscious conflict words (U); 
(middle) conscious symptom words (C); (right) Osgood unpleasant words (E–). 
Numbers in parentheses are the frequency averages.
1Notice that Marshall and Halligan’s (1988) striking results have not been replicated 
yet. The subject’s preferences could be due to the perception of minor differences 
rather than on an unconscious perception of real differences.
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encounters when trying to set up experiments on subjectivity. A 
psychoanalytic-style study (Silverman and Weinberger, 1985) has 
nevertheless shown how such a subliminal text as “mommy and 
I are one” has a positive effect on self-motivation that is lacking 
when we substitute a more neutral phrase like “people are walking” 
and while a negative one such as “destroy mother” has a destructive 
effect. Meta-analysis has shown the effect to be reproducible, but the 
reasons why are still challenged (Hardaway, 1990, Weinberger and 
Hardaway, 1990). Numerous researchers have claimed such phrases 
to be far too complex for unconscious cognition. For instance, 
Greenwald and Liu (1985) and Draine (1997) have shown two-
word grammatical combinations to be beyond the analytic pow-
ers of unconscious cognition. The subliminal phrase might have 
subliminal effect only in virtue of the words’ valence taken isolat-
edly. Nevertheless, other phrases have been tested and have never 
displayed such effect (Greenwald, 1992).
It is noteworthy that, in this study, the stimulus is not idiosyn-
cratic. Yet, its universal affective valence might compensate for its 
generality. If the unconscious seems to be limited in processing com-
plex representations, we might ask whether affective idiosyncratic 
values influence, for instance, the number of items one can retrieve. 
Anyway, the study of unconscious capacities, as affective process-
ing or memory, might offer some surprising results if one chooses 
stimuli that have specific connections to the subjects’ inner life. This 
epistemological point emphasizes that we cannot infer unconscious 
is dumb from its incapacity to perform what we do consciously. In 
others words, one of the most important Freudian contribution 
consists in having apprehended unconscious per se and not such as 
the strict negation of consciousness. Here, one finds a dimension 
for research in which the psychoanalytical insistence on subjective 
conditions of stimuli perception might inspire cognitive sciences.
second postulate: unconscious and conscious 
“cognitive styles”
The analysis of the first postulate has produced evidence of par-
ticularities of unconscious and conscious processes from numer-
ous psychological studies. A rule of thumb is that unconscious 
processes are more sensitive to affective stimuli, whereas conscious 
processes involve more complex representational processing. Thus, 
each seems to display a specific kind of functioning. To introduce 
the relevance of the second psychoanalytic postulate in the current 
scientific context, we need to keep in mind how Freudian concepts 
have different extensions if considered from the first or the sec-
ond topic perspectives – that is, from the “id” and the “ego.” Freud 
introduced these two concepts to reconfigure the boundaries of the 
unconscious–conscious dichotomy. The theory states that some 
aspects of the Id may become conscious, while some of the ego 
may be unconscious. Thus, the shift from reducing unconscious 
determinants to the sole repressed representations to a descriptive 
cognitive topology has left open room for a plurality of unconscious 
processes (including the cognitive one?). According to Carhart-
Harris and Friston (2010) the Id overlaps the characteristics Freud 
attributed to unconscious system. However, the Id might nominate 
a system subserving a specific mode of cognition, more than a psy-
chic region or apparatus. In the following section we aim to show 
how such a perspective leads unconscious processes to be under-
stood as an alternative type of cognition better than a weakened one.
meaning and colors are incongruent and faster when congruent (for 
example when the word “red” is painted in red). The reason that 
response latency increases is that the consciousness must necessarily 
repress the automatic semantic analysis of the word.
Numerous studies have confirmed these unconscious causal 
effects, especially those investigating subliminal effects. Priming 
is defined as a non-conscious form of memory that involves a 
change in the ability to identify, produce, or classify an item as a 
result of a previous encounter with it. Zajonc (1980) has shown 
how emotional stimuli of which we are unaware “color” our 
judgments. For example, pictures of smiling or scowling faces 
were subliminally presented to subjects prior to the task of rating 
the attractiveness of Chinese ideographs. Not only the affective 
values of priming had effects on the choice of the targets, but 
also suboptimal stimulations impacted judgments differently 
than optimal ones. Murphy and Zajonc (1993) report priming 
stimuli to induce “free floating” effects on non-specific objects. In 
contrast, optimal ones induced cognitive constraints that permit-
ted directing affective priming onto specific targets. The limited 
precision of unconscious affects is paralleled by the limitation of 
unconscious cognitive capacities. For instance, Sperling (1960) 
presented subjects a brief flash of 12 letters. The subjects suc-
ceeded in reporting a limited number of them (on average, about 
five). The point, here, is that subjects “unconsciously choose” 
the letters to report. As a matter of fact, all the items had to be 
unconsciously represented before being selected. It is noteworthy 
that measurements show that the longer the time between the 
exposure and the report is important, the weaker are the sub-
jects to report the items they have seen. Thus, the non-selected 
items have vanished from memory during the remembering task. 
From those limited memorial capacities, we can conclude that if 
unconscious processes are not dumb, it is even too optimistic to 
endow them with full intelligence2.
Nevertheless, one can ask whether those studies are methodo-
logically consistent with the way Freud theorized in terms of uncon-
scious processes. Sperling’s study simply shows how conscious 
attention is necessary for items to be encoded, but leaves open the 
question whether unconscious processes are able to actively per-
form complex tasks (we will review debates on unconscious learn-
ing in the Third Postulate: Unconscious Intentions or Goal-directed 
Unconscious Processes). On the other hand, one may ask whether 
the subliminal paradigm, as it is commonly used, is adequate to 
evaluate the Freudian theory especially as it insists on endogenous 
motives linked with an idiosyncratic inner life (Arminjon et al., 
2010). Even if we admit that awareness is a prerequisite to perform 
tasks with unknown and neutral stimuli, we can imagine specific 
stimuli to have complex impacts on the subjects’ inner life. What 
might happen with cognitive or affective stimuli having connec-
tions or entering in “resonance” with the patient’s affectivity? Would 
they have a merely diffuse influence, or even vanish as rapidly as in 
the Sperling’s task? Such questions are difficult to answer empiri-
cally, principally because of the methodological difficulties one 
2Naccache (2006) claims that the unconscious limited memorizing capacities 
forbidden the unconscious to be constituted of infantile repressed contents! The 
argument rests on the confusion between the existence of unconscious repressed 
contents and the unconscious capacities to memorize contents.
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in the normal subject). They have constituted lists of affect-laden 
words selected by clinicians on the basis of extensive interviews 
of patients. One list referenced the conscious articulation, on the 
patient’s part, of their psychic conflicts; the second referenced their 
unconscious psychic conflicts. Two conditions were evaluated:(1) 
words linked to the participants’ unconscious conflicts, presented 
subliminally and supraliminal, (2) words tied to their conscious 
symptoms, presented subliminally and supraliminally. The sub-
ject’s ERPs (evoked-response potential) were recorded. The results 
show different patterns of responses triggered by subliminal and 
supraliminal exposure (Figure 2). The unconscious conflict words 
presented subliminally showed a specific time–frequency pattern – 
high frequencies appear before lower ones – the conscious conflict 
words presented supraliminally, displayed a reverse pattern. In the 
supraliminal condition, the patterns for both categories of words 
were reversed too. Results suggest both kinds of words being associ-
ated and processed differently. Shevrin and his associates concluded 
from this experiment that these promising neurobiological evi-
dence points to the existence of two separate and hermetic systems.
More generally, the existence of two psychic modes has ceased to 
be merely an exotic Freudian claim, even if still challenged (Shanks, 
2010 for a review). The tenants of the dual-processing theories 
primary and secondary process
Given the observations he made in his clinical practice, Freud theo-
rized that psychosis, dreams, and free associations reveal a mode of 
cognition ordinarily suppressed or inhibited. As Freud (1936) puts it, 
in the unconscious, “the so-called “primary process” prevails, there is 
no synthesis of ideas, affects are liable to displacement, opposites are 
not mutually exclusive and may even coincide and condensation occurs 
as a matter of course. The sovereign principle is (…) that of obtaining 
pleasure.” In addition, the primary process is regarded as timeless, and 
irrational: “there are in this system no negation, no doubt, no degrees 
of certainty” (Freud, 1915c). This brings up the question: what are 
the current reasons for postulating two separate mode of cognition?
An interesting experiment addressing this question has been 
performed by Shevrin et al. (1996). In spite of being only based on 
subliminal and supraliminal stimulations, authors have respected 
the Freudian paradigm in working around the limits encoded in the 
protocols of normal psychological experiments, which are gener-
ally and intentionally blind to the individual differences that are 
claimed as determinants in psychoanalytical clinical work. Shevrin 
and his associates tried to test the power of idiosyncratic stimuli 
while working on subliminal perception, generally using universal 
emotional ones (i.e., those triggering the same emotional reactions 
Figure 2 | (Above) Convergences between Freud’s second topic and brain’s 
Large Intrinsic Network, after Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010). (Below) The 
default network (yellow/orange): the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, ventral 
medial prefrontal cortex, and hippocampal formation, when activated are 
correlated with the deactivation of the attentional system (blue): superior parietal 
lobule, intraparietal sulcus, the motion-sensitive middle temporal area, the 
frontal eye fields, the dorsal anterior cingulate, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
the ventral premotor cortex, and the frontal operculum.
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perform the fundamental economic transformation that inhibits 
the primary process of the mind.” In fact, the authors report cases 
of bilateral ventromesial damage that correlates with contradictions 
in patients’ thought and separate temporal events amalgamation. 
Kaplan-Solms and Solms conclude that the ventromesial cortex 
underpins the functions Freud attributed to the ego.
pleasure–unpleasure principles
Some neuroscientists even acknowledged the Freudian perspec-
tive to represent a more consistent biological model because of its 
inclusion of motivations or drives. As Sloman (1996) puts it, Freud 
“describes a primary process in which energy spreads around the 
psyche, collecting at ideas that are important to the individual and 
making them more intensive. He held this process responsible for 
channeling wish fulfillment and pain avoidance. On the other hand, 
a person must try to satisfy this urges in a world full of obstacles and 
boundaries. Gratification must sometimes be delayed. Inhibiting 
this primary process, and thus making both gratifications more 
likely in the long run and behavior more socially acceptable, is 
secondary process thought, governed by the reality principle.”
As mentioned by Sloman, the primary process is ruled by the 
pleasure principle, and not by reality. In its Project for a scientific psy-
chology, Freud speculated that unicellular organisms are governed 
by the need to avoid excitation (Arminjon et al., 2010). As a con-
sequence, he supposed that pluricellular organisms cannot evade 
inner stimuli without splitting themselves. Consequently, they have 
to balance excitations to low level. This biological conception can be 
seen as a homeostatic proto-theory applied to psyche. The natural 
tendency of the cells (or as we would say, neurons) is to avoid energy 
accumulation by discharging it. This idea led Freud to imagine 
the brain as having to bind energy in order to reach the mini-
mal possible energetic state. Hence, the primary process might be 
characterized by “motile” or “free” energy, diffused throughout the 
whole neural system. Freud hypothesized that in order to perform 
a specific action, the secondary process has to inhibit (to bind) the 
mobile energy. Thus, the inhibition is processed by the formation 
of learning pathways. However, Freud imagined the Ego to auto-
organize itself in this way, by inhibiting free energy. For instance, 
an inner need is linked to motor representations that previously led 
to satisfaction. Thus, when they feel angriness; newborns activate 
these encoded pathways and hallucinate the desired satisfaction. 
This pseudo-satisfaction might represent a short-term relief while 
waiting for the real satisfaction. Energy accumulation might explain 
the emergence of goal representation. Yet, the real question is not to 
determine the optimal strategy for achieving satisfaction, but how 
to inhibit the irrelevant detours. Freud has resolved the problem by 
referring to Helmholtz’s model according to which the state of the 
selection and improvement of actions at time t1 is derived from 
the comparison of previously successful actions, intentions, motor 
sensations, and/or perceptions. For instance, the hallucination or 
activation of the motor patterns can be taken as a prediction of 
the desired states. In case of non-congruence between intentions 
and actions in the aftermath, the system has to select other motor 
patterns or to improve it. In any cases, both necessitate inhibition.
New perspectives have been brought out on the “free-energy” 
model (Friston et al., 2006). Raichle and Snyder (2007) have shown 
that the medial prefrontal cortex, the  posterior  cingulate cortex, the 
posit a similar statement acknowledging Freud being one of the 
first (among others) to posit the existence of two distinct modes 
of psychic functioning (for a review on dual-processes theories, 
see Evans, 2008). Despite the fact that there are major disputes 
among advocates of dual-processing theories, the common state-
ments make a clear distinction between cognitive processes that are 
fast, automatic and unconscious, and those that are slow, deliberative 
and conscious. Such a statement, appeared in the 1970s (Posner 
and Snyder, 1975; Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977), has emerged as a 
compromise solution to the old debate on the mechanism of cogni-
tion, whether it is best taken as a composite of parallel processors 
or as a controlled, computer-like, sequential computation. If the 
former hypothesis seems to be more neurobiologically realistic, the 
latter still might best account for the phenomenological conscious 
experience. In the context of the present essay, it is noteworthy that 
numerous authors have showed the two modes of cognition to be 
reifiable, complementary, and, sometime, to be conflicting. The first 
is generally supposed to be rule-based, i.e., to describe the world by 
capturing causal, logical, hierarchical structures (Sloman, 1996). The 
second is thought to be associative, i.e., encoding statistical regulari-
ties, drawing inferences on the basis of similarity and contiguity. 
Medin et al. (1990) have proposed those cognitive modes to entail 
two kinds of categorization: attributional and relational similari-
ties. For instance, categorization according to relational similarities 
associates whales with mammals on account of their obeying the 
rules defining mammals as vertebrates, air breathing, placental ani-
mals – but the categorization by attributional similarities associates 
whales with fishes. Similarly, “cigars” and “cigarets” belong to the 
same category in respect of their relational similarities, but cigars 
may be attributionally associated with phalluses, by reason of salient 
and not conceptual similarities. Brakel et al. (2002) have proposed to 
use Medin experimental design to test three hypotheses drawn from 
the assumption that primary processes use attributional categoriza-
tions and secondary processes use relational ones. In accordance 
with Freud’s view, studies show (1) that attributional categoriza-
tion predominates when stimuli are presented subliminally, whereas 
relational categorization prevails when stimuli are presented supral-
iminally. Moreover, Freud hypothesized that the child, at age seven, 
experiences a mental change that results in the dominance of the 
primary process over the secondary ones. As predicted, (2) the same 
categorizing task shows the predominance of attributional categori-
zation until about the age of seven. Lastly, (3) it has been confirmed 
that patients with anxiety disorders display a marked tendency to 
favor attributional categorization. To sum up, the primary process 
might be an early cognition mode inhibited by the secondary ones, 
especially because of cognition and cultural maturation. Both modes 
might process in parallel, sometime dominating in abnormal psy-
chological states or during specific conscious states.
Evidently, the existence of two cognitive styles seems well admit-
ted. The irrational nature of primary processes – i.e., not obey-
ing the principle of non-contradiction – has to be acknowledged 
by contrast with the ruled-based function of secondary process. 
The timeless characteristic might be seen as an aftermath of the 
primary process tolerance for contradiction. We can hypothesize 
that the sense of time depends on the causal nature of secondary 
process thinking. At a neurobiological level, Kaplan-Solms and 
Solms (2000) have proposed “the ventromesial frontal cortex [to] 
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inferior parietal lobule, the lateral and inferior temporal cortex and 
the medial temporal lobes constitute the “default mode network” 
underlying self-referential processing and autobiographical recol-
lection. It has been proposed (Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000) that 
these structures, including the ventromesial frontal cortex, perform 
the ego functions. As a matter of fact, there is a low degree of connec-
tivity between the medial prefrontal cortex and the medial temporal 
lobe in childhood that increases during the brain development. This 
development is hypothesized to be related to the dynamic control 
and modulation of hedonic and emotional functions. According 
to a recent article by Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010), “the brain 
uses internal hierarchical models to predict its sensory input and 
suggests that neuronal activity (and synaptic connections) try to 
minimize the ensuing prediction error or (Helmholtz) free energy.” 
The higher-level processing might form predictions from sensory 
input and convey them backward to low-level structures (Figure 3). 
As a consequence, free energy or prediction error is reduced in 
lower-level systems so as to optimize the representation of the inner 
or outer world, that is to say, of the nature and the origin of stimuli. 
The prediction-error reduction is conjectured to explain how bio-
logical systems display homeostasis, understood as the maintenance 
of a constant low energetic basal state. In a way, equilibrium has to 
be maintained between primary and secondary processes. The Ego 
role of the medial prefrontal cortex seems to be confirmed by its 
connectivity reduction in schizophrenia (Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 
2009) or the necessity to activate the medial prefrontal cortex to 
inhibit memories in posttraumatic disorders (Shin et al., 2006). In 
other words, in normal conditions, primary and secondary pro-
cesses have reciprocal and equilibrated influences. Nevertheless, 
in pathological states, the pleasure principle might have oversized 
effects, that is to say, may allow irrational, a temporal, and associa-
tive cognition, instead of the reality principle, dominate. Hence, 
the dynamic constraints exerted by the two cognitive styles Freud 
imagined appear to be corroborated by current speculative models 
of localized brain function and several neurological facts. Most 
importantly, the way the two modes interact and neutralize them-
selves may condition a range of impaired states, from the eruption 
of some elements from the primary process to the total loss of the 
reality principle.
third postulate: unconscious intentions or goal-
directed unconscious processes
The existence of two distinct modes of cognition is generally 
accepted in the scientific community, even if the specific charac-
teristics of each mode are still a matter of dispute. If we suppose, as 
did Freud, that unconscious processes are complex, psychological, 
and cognitively independent and exert a causal influence on con-
sciousness, the question becomes whether it makes sense to impute 
intentionality and goal directedness to the unconscious. As we have 
seen, the general assumption makes a clear-cut distinction between 
immediate, automatic and unconscious processes and those that 
are mediated, deliberative and conscious. Only the latter are gener-
ally admitted to match with the feelings associated with conscious 
control. In this section, we want to show that debates concerning the 
existence of unconscious intentions have led numerous researchers 
to challenge the distinction between automatic and control systems. 
On the one hand the impossibility for unconscious intention to 
be set up and perform out of conscious control is now challenged. 
On the other hand, the automaticity of unconscious processes is 
constructed in opposition with the apparent control consciousness 
seems to exert. Challenging these postulates leads to a new view 
concerning brain and mind organization with repercussions for 
how we are to understand unconscious processes and the role of 
consciousness.
unconscious intentions
Posner and Snyder (1975) produced a dual-processing theory 
according to which recognition of a target stimulus first pro-
ceeds unconsciously. During the first step, that is to say prior to 
the threshold of awareness, a stimulus is compared to the oth-
ers encoded in long-term memory. Such a position is compatible 
with the associative and distributed characterization of uncon-
scious processes. It supposes the same stimuli to be encoded in 
different areas, in different codes and processed in parallel. Then, 
consciousness might impose: “a serial order upon what are essen-
tially widespread parallel processes initiated by a stimulus” (Posner 
Figure 3 | Since the study by Merikle, unconscious processes are said to 
be unable to influence conscious processing without being reportable, 
after Dehaene and Naccache (2001). (A) Unconscious processing stream 
executing without conscious control. (B) Influence of a conscious context or 
instruction on unconscious processing. (C) Impossible situation: top-down 
control by an unconscious stimulus.
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However, certain questions arise in view of these findings. First, 
does the Freudian unconscious require the existence of the uncon-
scious capacity to set goals, i.e., to set goals without consciousness being 
involved? Second, does the exogenous origin of stimuli, in Merikle’s 
experiments, modify Dehaene and Naccache’s conclusion? On the one 
hand, the conscious origin of goal-directed intention is not incompat-
ible with the Freudian theory. Freud (1915) clearly claims that repressed 
contents have their original source in consciousness. Actually, the psy-
choanalytic paradigm is not incompatible with unconscious contents 
having been consciously perceived before becoming unconscious and 
automatic. On the other hand, such claim also does not forbid the 
hypothesis of unconscious intentionality. For instance, consider the 
somatic marker hypothesis by Damasio (1994). The Damasian hypoth-
esis posits that the brainstem, hypothalamus, insular cortex and the 
right somatosensory cortex map to certain bodily states and cognitive 
processes. Somatic markers might play a preselecting role on strategies 
before being processed at a cognitive (rational) level. Thus, emotional 
mechanisms might process independently of conscious processes and 
interfere with the latter in prioritizing certain options (i.e., dumping 
or repressing3 them). The somatic markers evolve on the basis of past 
experiences that may have been conscious once. But the latter condi-
tion does not prohibit the somatic markers having, now, their “own 
intentions” (sometimes in contradiction with conscious ones), even 
if considered as automatics and non-conscious.
Moreover, synaptic transmission is modulated by experiences. 
Facilitated synapses, those that fire together, constitute the neu-
ronal assemblies underpinning our memories (Buzsaki, 2004). 
The inscription of experience is not a picture of experiences. As a 
dynamical process, plasticity introduces discontinuity throughout 
the inscription of experience (Ansermet and Magistretti, 2007). 
Traces are associated with previous ones, combined with other 
sets of traces and desires and, finally, constitute a dynamic and 
autonomous inner life. So, if consciousness is a prerequisite for the 
setting of strategies that might, in the future, be processed uncon-
sciously, we can hypothesize that synaptic plasticity must induce 
new and idiosyncratic associations, which suggest that they could 
be seen as unconsciously elaborated intentions that do not require 
consciousness to be perform and control. Such a claim gains in 
credibility when one considers theories of autopoesis. Kauffman 
(1995) has shown how artificial cells, in random Boolean network, 
reach homeostatic and more or less steady structures. In other 
words, novel strategies might self-organize without any top down 
or conscious control, as an “order for free” emerges from systems 
evolving at the edge of chaos. From this and similar complexity 
theories, we can produce an account that diminishes the need 
to postulate consciousness as the ever present prerequisite for 
decision-making-like mechanisms. But if we can challenge the 
postulate according to which unconscious intentions cannot be set 
up and perform out of consciousness control, conscious control 
is disputable too4.
et al., 1973). Posner’s model has helped form a dogma according 
to which conscious attention is a prerequisite to any kind of vol-
untary control exerts on unconscious automatic processes. The 
study by Merikle et al. (1995) is one of the best illustrations of 
the central role attributed to consciousness in the setting of a 
cognitive strategy. Like the Stroop task, subjects were asked to 
classify a colored string preceded by a prime word naming the 
color. The Stroop effect was obtained when the situation presented 
congruence between names and colors in comparison to non-
congruence. But the reverse effect appeared when manipulating 
the predictability of congruent matches, for instance in present-
ing 75% of incongruent trials. The subject responded faster by 
predicting likely outcomes. However, if the pairs were presented 
subliminally, the effect collapsed and the Stroop effect returned 
to normal. As Dehaene and Naccache (2001) conclude: “we ten-
tatively suggest, as a generalization, that the strategic operations 
which are associated with planning a novel strategy, evaluating it, 
controlling its execution, and correcting possible errors cannot 
be accomplished unconsciously” (Figure 4). In other words, no 
intentional strategy can be set up unconsciously. Such conclusion 
seems to be confirmed by blindsight patients’ incapacity to dis-
play spontaneous visually guided behavior in their impaired field, 
whereas they succeed to localize or recognize objects when forced 
(Dennett, 1991; Weiskrantz, 1997; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).
Nevertheless, others works has emerged to support the thesis of 
unconscious autonomous intentions setting. One of the most con-
vincing demonstrations (Perruchet, 1985, see Shanks, 2010, for chal-
lenges to this result) has involved dissociating learning from awareness. 
Subjects were presented tones that were, in half the cases, followed 
by an air puff directed at their eyes. In-between the two events, they 
were asked to rate their subjective expectation for the tone to be fol-
lowed by the air puff. The analysis revealed subjects to be more likely 
to blink their eyes after reinforced trials associating the tone with the 
puff; however, their subjective expectation that air puff would occur 
tended to decrease. Thus, participants (consciously) expected a dif-
ferent outcome to occur compared to their unconscious intentions. 
Thus, the Perruchet effect argues in favor of implicit learning, allowing 
(at least basic) unconscious strategies to be set up.
Figure 4 | Symbolic representation of the hierarchy of connections 
between competing brain processors, after Dehaene and Naccache 
(2001). Processors are mobilized into the workspace. As a counterpart, even if 
active, some others are kept out (repressed) of it.
3See Section “Fourth Postulate: Conflict as a Cause of Psychic (Auto)Organization” 
for the definition of repression as an unconscious set up of suppression.
4Here it might be relevant to distinguish between “a purposeful end-seeking pro-
cess” and “a non-purposeful end-seeking process.” For instance, SOAR (see Newell, 
1990) is a symbolic cognitive architecture that instantiates goal-directed mechani-
sms of the second kind.
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from the interpretation of cues to cognitive causality, then apparent 
mental causation is generated by an interpretative process that is 
fundamentally separate from the mechanistic process of real mental 
causation” (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999).
From his work on split-brain patients, Gazzaniga (1985) 
hypothesized the existence of a cerebral system that retrospec-
tively constructed such interpretations from behavior outcomes. 
In this context, it is noteworthy that we have abundant evidences 
that interpretations are often constituted at the expense of facts. 
Numerous reports show that subjects who are ignorant of the real 
causes of action will often invent false but consistent stories. Split-
brain patients and subjects who were cued, in their neglected side, 
to perform certain actions will, when asked, fabulate explanations to 
rationalize their behaviors. Gazzaniga supposes this “interpreter” to 
be generally localized in the left hemisphere. In the same line Nisbett 
and Wilson (1977) have shown that introspective reports are gen-
erally stylized so as to be consistent with cultural and personal 
theories; moreover, self-analysis of choices impaired the quality 
of decisions that usually occur automatically (Wilson et al., 1993). 
From this body of evidences, it is logical to suppose that conscious 
reports might be simply the retroactive constructions of a narrative 
self (see Gallagher, 2000 for a review) or an autobiographical self 
(Damasio, 1999), which functions to enable the sense of a continu-
ous self. In this way, the “illusion” of control has a biological and 
social function.
In the same line, brain anatomy seems to support the idea 
that conscious control is an illusion. Frith et al. (2000) argue 
that intended movements are represented in the prefrontal and 
premotor cortex, whereas representations guiding action are 
encoded in the parietal cortex. Moreover, studies have shown 
that working memory, usually considered as the prerequisite of 
conscious awareness, is not a unitary mechanism, but is rather a 
the illusion oF conscious control
The question of unconscious intentions is intimately linked to 
the sense that consciousness is ultimately a matter of control. 
Accordingly, criticisms of the “old concepts” of psychology are 
 coordinated with the project of showing how the “feeling” of control 
is a “user illusion,” disguising the actual relation of the conscious-
ness and the unconscious. Thus, according to Bargh (2005), for 
example, conscious control is an illusion resting on the subjective 
experience of “making a choice or forming an intention, and then 
enacting the decision or behavior, and tak[ing] this as incontrovert-
ible evidence that the intention caused the outcome.” The renewed 
interest in the nature of unconscious activity has been driven by 
the growing suspicion about the actual scope of consciousness in 
the behavior of human beings (Wegner, 2003).
Libet (2004), in a series of famous experiments, showed that 
electrical potential precedes intentional movement by a minimum 
of 550 and 250 ms before subject’s awareness of its will to act. As 
well, the evidence for dissociating consciousness from learning and 
initiating actions logically leads to the premise that willful actions 
have no direct causative power. For example, in a study by Wegner 
and Wheatley (1999) test subjects, grouped in couples (one of whom 
was a confederate of the experimenters) were asked to point, with a 
cursor, at pictures referring to objects. Instructions were given over 
headphones so as to manipulate the subjects into believing that they 
were moving the cursor, whereas the confederates were doing it. 
When congruent words–pictures were presented about 1–5 s before 
the action, subjects reported having intentionally moved the cursor. 
The feeling dissipated when the words were presented 30 s before 
or 1 s after the action occurred. From the fallibility of conscious 
attribution, the authors concluded that the real mechanisms initiat-
ing behaviors might actually never be present in consciousness. As 
the authors put it “… if conscious will is an experience that arises 
Table 1 | Labels attached to unconscious (ucs) in the neurocognitive literature, aligned on the four postulates of Freudian unconscious.
Freudian unconscious Convergences between Freudian and neurocognitive 
unconscious
relevant references
First postulate Ucs processes are psychological – can be described as 
such
Shevrin and Dickman (1980), Bucci (1997)
Displays psychological abilities Emotions are processed unconsciously Whalen et. al. (1998), Damasio (1994), Zajonc (1980)
Complex tasks are processed unconsciously Silverman and Weinberger (1985), Marshall and Halligan 
(1988)
Second postulate Ucs displays a specific cognitive style Shevrin et al. (1996), Brakel (2004)
Displays a specific cognitive style Ucs is ruled by associative thinking Sloman (1996), Shevrin et al. (1996), Brakel et al. (2002)
Ucs cognition is ruled by the pleasure principle Sloman (1996), Ansermet and Magistretti (2007)
Third postulate Goals can be settled unconsciously Baars (1988), Arminjon (2010), Perruchet (1985)
Is intentional – sets goals Ucs determines idiosyncrasy Ansermet and Magistretti (2007), Reiman et al. (1997)
Ucs cognition is creative and heuristic Ansermet and Magistretti (2007), Sloman (1996)
Fourth postulate Ucs auto-organizes itself through conflicts Baars (1988), Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010), Dehaene 
and Naccache (2001)
Structures itself through conflicts Some ucs contents are repressed Erdelyi (2001), Baars (1988)
Infantile experiences shape procedural ucs and repression Mancia (2006), Bucci (1997)
In black, authors that explicitly propose empirical and/or theoretical neurocognitive works that converge with some aspects of the four postulates of Freudian 
unconscious. In gray, works that we propose to show relevant convergences with specific aspects of the four postulates, even if authors do not refer explicitly to, 
or are critical toward psychoanalysis.
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instances even as they operate within them, as in the case of ego 
cleavage. Last but not least, the pleasure/unpleasure principle led 
Freud to its most challenged concepts: opposition between death 
and life drives (1920). In this section we show that new models of 
brain function suggest that Freud’s dynamic was prescient. If the 
first wave of cognitive models seemed to show that the Freudian 
unconscious was partly misconstrued, the latest researches, under 
the paradigm of distributed cognitive functions, are much more 
in line with Freud’s theories.
the distributed and conFlicting brain
As seen above, disputes about the existence of unconscious inten-
tions have reflected a paradigm shift in cognitive neuroscience. 
Neuroscientists have criticized the attribution of complete control 
to the consciousness, as well as the classical opposition between 
automatic versus controlled processes, in the light of distributed 
and parallel models of brain functioning. As Freud supposed, cog-
nitive processes are not linear, but could easily be regarded as using 
conflict as an organizing principle. As we have seen, the Posner’s 
model stemmed from the assumption that consciousness is serial 
and of a limited capacity. As Allport (1989) put it, writing about 
models previous to that of the one devised by Broadbent (1958), 
“information not selected was therefore excluded from semantic cat-
egorization identification, and selection, according to this interpreta-
tion, was synonymous with selective processing, that is, shutting out 
of non-selected information from further analysis.” Such arbitrary 
parameters (which exclude the notion of the active unconscious a 
priori) were challenged by Shaffer (1975) who demonstrated that 
attention was not always limited to one channel. For instance, if we 
can listen to a speech and copy-type at the same time, we can hardly 
read aloud a text and audio-type at the same time. Hence, if the 
brain can process different kinds of representations in parallel, the 
limitations of attention might not depend on limited representa-
tional capacities, neither on the rigid limitations of a central control 
capacity, but on specific interferences between different modalities.
Along the same lines is the work that has been done with neg-
ligent patients, who are unaware of objects on their left side, or 
distant objects, or isolated sensory modalities. Obviously, the great 
variety of their spatial attention disturbances pleads in favor of a 
distributed attentional system. Hence, in contrast with one channel 
attention models, Allport proposed that a multiplicity of special-
ized systems might underlie discrete attentional resources, which 
in turn would suppose numerous and distinct types of constraints 
corresponding to the system itself and its interrelation with other 
systems. According to Allport’s (1989) model: (1) The environment 
is partly unpredictable, (2) systems have to manage multiple and 
concurrent goals in order to adapt to the inner and outer world, 
(3) discrete systems have to coordinate all their subcomponents to 
impose their own “goals,” (4) attentional systems require selective 
priority assignments in order to coordinate the conflicting inten-
tions in a consistent active or dynamical attentional set. As a con-
sequence, the so-called limited capacity of consciousness might be 
seen as an indirect and unexpected result, a compromise emerging 
from competitive and distributed subsystems. In this model, lower 
subsystems or subsets of microfeatures will still operate even outside 
of the scope of conscious attention. As Shevrin et al. (1996) put it: 
“As a consequence, the notions of automatic and controlled lose 
distributed function localized in different areas of the frontal and 
prefrontal cortex (Baddeley, 1986). According to Bargh (2005), 
“The storage of current intentions in brain locations that are ana-
tomically separate from their associated and currently operating 
action programs would appear to be nothing less than the neural 
basis for non-conscious goal pursuit and other forms of unin-
tended behavior.” In other words, action programs might function 
without and independently of conscious control. As a matter of 
fact, patients with unilateral or bilateral frontal lesions cannot 
inhibit grasping or using objects falling in their perceptual fields. 
This observation supports the claim that conscious intentions are 
not necessary for complex actions to be perfectly performed and 
guided (Lhermitte, 1983). Obviously the psychoanalytic field has 
to consider with a great interest such promising data even if, as 
we have seen, the endogenous setting of unconscious intentions is 
not a corner stone of psychoanalysis. Yet, by opening a room for 
unconsciously settled goals, neuropsychology makes even more 
obvious the reasons that led Freud to claim (against the academic 
psychology of its time) “the ego is not master in its own house” 
(Freud, 1917).
If subjects do not have access to the real causes underlying their 
intentions, the automatic/controlled (Posner and Snyder, 1975) 
dichotomy is threatened. So, the very question turns to determine 
the causative impact consciousness might have on unconscious 
processes. If consciousness is not necessary for the setting of novel 
strategies, it might trigger a momentary cognitive “reset” (Baars, 
1988) allowing for new adaptive associations (Cleeremans, 2008). 
Instead of being taken as a controlling instance, it might be more 
relevantly conceived as a brief neurocognitive dynamic state cata-
lyzing reorganization of unconscious associations through plastic-
ity and reconsolidation (Alberini, 2005; Dudai, 2006; Arminjon 
et al., 2010). The latter hypothesis might provide to psychoanalytic 
insight and its curative effects a neurocognitive ground.
Fourth postulate: conFlict as a cause oF psychic 
(auto)organization
For several researchers involved in the psychoanalytic field, the 
Freudian unconscious is, for dynamic reasons, still dramatically 
irreducible to the cognitive unconscious. They point cognitive 
models in which any unconscious ideation can, in principle, reach 
consciousness. If in actuality they do not, the reason has to do 
simply with brain structure (on those questions, see Wilson, 2002). 
Moreover, according to the psychoanalytic field, cognitive uncon-
scious processes are composed by perceptive, learning etc. mecha-
nisms, far from the infantile primitive drives and desires Freud 
supposed as the basis of unconscious motivation. As a matter of 
fact, from the beginning of his psychoanalytical career, Freud put 
forward the idea of opposing forces as exerting an ontogenetic and 
organizing role for inner life. As seen above, equilibrium is supposed 
to result from the secondary process that involves the inhibition of 
the primary one. A second major dynamic and economic opposi-
tion, overlapping the latter, is tied with pleasure and unpleasure 
principles. In Freud’s words, what is displeasure for one system 
might represent pleasure for another (Freud, 1920). With the sec-
ond topic theoretic shift, conflicts involve the disjunction between 
the Id as the “reservoir” of drives, the ego, and the super ego as the 
depositary of social norms. Conflicts are thus conceived between 
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ily mobilized and made available to the global workspace, and 
therefore to consciousness.” One can figure out how spontaneous 
generation of stochastic activity might induce the synchronization 
of groups of neurons in order to respond to contextual inner and 
outer needs. Neuron of one assembly might “win” the struggle for 
priority against subspecial neurons of another. Multiple biological 
needs (drives), mapped at a cortical level, might enter in competi-
tion to impose the priority of their satisfaction.
This picture of a dynamic hierarchy also allows establishing a typol-
ogy of the different unconscious processes coordinated with their con-
scious accessibility. Naccache (2006) has hypothesized three categories 
of unconscious. The first is that of a structural unconscious which is 
incapable of surfacing to the consciousness. Such a structural uncon-
scious must rest on the functional architecture of the brain, i.e., the 
synaptic ponderation. For instance, Zajonc (1968) demonstrated that 
repeated exposure to stimuli orients unconscious preference toward 
it. Structural unconscious, similarly, might refer to the procedural 
processes performed without awareness, as in using language or play-
ing an instrument, without there being a dimension that enters into 
conscious articulation. In echo with the Freudian approach, we can 
add to the structural unconscious all the somatic representations of 
the internal milieu that never became conscious. A second category5 
of unconscious systems subsumes unconscious representations con-
nected to the global workspace, but not currently top-down amplified, 
as is in the case of the rich representational unconscious processes we 
cited in the first part of this paper. For instance, subliminal stimuli 
are perceived unconsciously and need time to be mobilized in the 
workspace through a “self-sustained long-distance loop.” Finally, 
another category of unconscious processes consists of those that 
could become conscious but that did not, for a reason or another, 
for instance, the words in the study by Sperling in section 1 (only few 
words become conscious but it could have been any of them). How 
are we to distinguish the second and third categories? All unconscious 
contents of the third category contain the capacity to be articulated in 
the consciousness. Those contents can or could have been conscious. 
Freud named those representations that remain outside of the sweep 
of the consciousness for contingent reasons, preconscious contents.
What about repressed unconscious? Before Freud introduced 
the second topic, he qualified as unconscious only repressed rep-
resentations. He distinguished (1915) two kinds of repression, one 
operating consciously and the second unconsciously6. Anderson and 
Green (2001) have shown how repression initiated consciously can 
be empirically presented. So, the remaining but important psycho-
analytical question is whether repression can be initiated uncon-
sciously. Despite the lack of empirical studies, one could propose 
suppression to be automated as part of a suppressing neural route 
(Wilson and Dunn, 2004, for a review). As seen in part three, it does 
not make a difference if repression has been unconsciously set up, 
their distinctness: control process, in the sense of being affected by 
motives, can go on outside of the focus of current attention (…). The 
picture one can draw from Allport’s model begins to approximate a 
psychoanalytic model in which internal and unconscious motives, 
that are related to basic needs or drives, shape cognitive processes 
both within and outside consciousness, once we link consciousness 
with the current attentional engagement.” So, the question is how 
or according to which organization principle, cognitive processes 
are really shaped by the multiplicity of basic needs?
Allport’s model lends support to the thesis of there being logi-
cally consistent unconscious goals or motives. As a correlate of the 
third postulate, it entails that subsystems not within the scope of 
awareness at some given time are not therefore shut off and are 
still at work, even if they do not represent a current priority. The 
Freudian theory, according to which unconscious processes are 
silently active and can interfere with conscious processes, appears as 
even more plausible once this picture of attention is given. Another 
consequence is that all the models that project the functioning of 
multiple systems while one is raised into consciousness elevate con-
flict and inhibition to central causes of auto-organization. Allport’s 
model, like Freud’s, takes attention to be at the frontier of inner and 
outer world. The monitoring of both worlds involves the competi-
tion of each subsystem inter alia for attention space. In this context, 
the theoretical foundations of current neuroscience models are in 
line with the Freudian claims about psychic conflicts, especially with 
such concepts as that of compromise formations, repression etc.
For instance, Driver and Vuilleumier (2001) have shown how 
neglect behavior following brain lesions is not the result of pri-
mary cortex impairment. Rather, neglect appears as an example 
of conscious attention functioning in normal subjects as a means 
to modulate brain activity. We generally perceive the stimuli that 
are filtered in order to fill our attempts. Single-neuron recordings 
show that, for a same stimulus, neuronal activity varies as a func-
tion of the attentional state of the observer (Parasuraman, 1998). 
Neglect patients are able to detect, in their neglected left side, a 
stimulus in isolation, whereas they fail to consciously perceive it if 
another stimulus is presented at the same time. Inversely, stimuli 
linked together (gestalt) are more likely to be perceived than isolated 
ones. As an explanation, lesions in neglect patients’ parietal cortex 
might induce a bias in the competition of brain areas. According 
to Driver and Vuilleumier (2001), the “winner-takes-all” princi-
ple by Desimone and Duncan (1995), might be applicable here, 
according to which “multiple concurrent stimuli always compete 
to drive neurons and dominate the network (and thus ultimately 
to dominate awareness and behavior).”
implications on unconscious
Even if its adherents may challenge the Freudian implications of this 
position, the neuronal model of a global workspace can easily be seen 
as one of the best examples of the rebirth of psychodynamic(Baars, 
1988). Deriving its claims from the hypothesis that the brain is com-
posed of low-level subspecial functions, the hypothesis of attention 
conflicts posits consciousness to emerge (bottom up) when many 
subcomponents exchange information and synchronize their activ-
ities forming a group or a “neuronal global workspace.” According 
Posner and Dehaene (1994): “top-down attentional amplification 
is the mechanism by which modular processes can be temporar-
5Naccache adds a second category for unconscious processes that might be consi-
dered as properly representational but that cannot be connected to the workspa-
ce model. The necessity to separate this category from the first keeps it unclear. 
Obviously, it depends on whether we adopt an internal definition of representation 
as a neurobiological state within which conceptual or psycho-affective concepts are 
coded, or as conceptual or psycho-affective descriptions attributed to the functio-
nal activity of neurobiological states.
6According to Erdelyi (2001) and Mancia (2006) this distinction has mostly been 
emphasized by A. Freud and was not a central for Freud.
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attachment result from a “right hemisphere to right hemisphere com-
munication.” Hence, infant experiences might have a deep impact on 
brain structures underpinning the unconscious processes regulating 
desires and motives, more than determining specific representational 
contents per se (Mancia, 2006). In other words, the unconscious do 
not process infantile representations, but is significantly dynamically 
structured by infantile experiences. Such a statement is consistent 
with the model by Bucci (1997) that emphasizes the early presymbolic 
and plurimodal symbolic encoding of affective and sensory experi-
ences. In the same line, Mancia proposed these experiences to shape 
newborns’ procedural memory and form an implicit “unrepressed 
memory” distinct from the repressed one, that needs the maturation 
of explicit memory and symbolic abilities. Stemmed on the existence of 
two separate, but connected, neuronal systems underpinning the two 
kinds of memory – respectively Amygdala for implicit memory, hip-
pocampus and frontal cortex for explicit one – the model posits that the 
unrepressed unconscious determinates the way defense mechanisms 
interfere with explicit contents retrieval. In this way, infantile experi-
ences might shape the modes of compromise solutions one constitutes 
to solve inner conflicts.
conclusion
We have started from the seminal paper of Shevrin and Dickman 
(1980) according to whom the existence of unconscious complex 
psychological processes is hardly doubted by mainstream cognitive 
science. We have shown that the unconscious–conscious dichotomy 
is not accounted for by the primitive/complex and dumb/smart 
ones devised by one evolutionary theory of the brain. Instead, we 
have tried to show that unconscious processes have to be taken as a 
complex cognitive style per se, rather than as a weaker form of cogni-
tion. If we accept the independence and complexity of unconscious 
processes, we must consider whether the evidences show that the 
unconscious could be goal directed. As we have shown, the positive 
answer to this question challenges the traditional partition of the 
mind into unconscious–automated and conscious-controlled pro-
cesses. The interest among neuroscientists in the conscious control 
illusions seems to lead to the same conclusion. Accordingly, in a more 
speculative way, we have shown the consequences for abandoning 
the automatic–controlled paradigm in favor of the distributed and 
competitive conception of cerebral functions. It is with this picture 
of the dynamical organization of brain processes that we find a 
scientifically informed framework for the relevant conjunction of 
the neuroscientific discoveries and the Freudian hypotheses.
Actually, psychoanalysts might argue this view to be too narrow 
and adding some further postulates and dimensions. Yet, we just 
have tried to fill in the implications of Shevrin and Dickman’s basic 
listing of the Freudian unconscious specificities and hope more evi-
dences to be uncovered for the list to be clarified and completed. In 
the waiting, it no longer seems unrealistic to posit Freud’s hypotheses 
on unconscious as something psychological, displaying its specific 
rules, having its own goals to satisfy and being at least partly com-
posed of repressed contents. In return, the psychoanalytical field has 
to take into account that current works exceed the characteristics 
that Freud was attributing to the unconscious processes. This means 
that the unconscious has not to be restricted to infantile contents, 
drives or repressing mechanisms. Paradoxically, in showing how 
almost all cognitive functions may be processed unconsciously, 
or is based on some initial conscious processes progressively made 
automatic. Nevertheless, the workspace model yields a somewhat 
relevant framework for the Freudian preconscious–unconscious dis-
tinction. In order to preserve the specificity of the second category 
of the unconscious, Dehaene and Naccache (2001) focused on the 
defining role of dynamic constraints, which involve those contents 
that have been bracketed from the consciousness on account of the 
fact that they have not been top-down amplified. This claims sound 
all the more Freudian if we keep in mind that in the global workspace 
model, microfeatures (for us drives) have to struggle to impose their 
output (Figure 4). Conversely, to be top-down amplified, they have 
to fit the workspace values. To become a dominant coalition, micro-
features have to engage a bottom up struggle to impose themselves7.
Both processes might overlap the two kinds of repressing mecha-
nisms. One can easily construct scenarios in which top-down atten-
tional amplification functions to “avoid” certain representations for 
explicit reasons. Others might not be admitted in the global workspace, 
even if trying to8. Many reason for their repression might be raised, 
especially affective ones. Here we can think of the Damasian somatic 
markers hypothesis. As we seen in part 3, “Third Postulate: Unconscious 
Intentions or Goal-directed Unconscious Processes”,  some strategies 
are preselected before reaching rational deliberations. In a way, they 
are automatically avoided (unconsciously repressed) because they acti-
vate a negative somatic state. In such cases, these “repressed” contents 
might remain unconscious, not for anatomical or structural reasons 
as in Naccache’s first category, but rather for dynamic ones. As seen 
in part two, the medial prefrontal cortex blockade of memories is 
hypothesized to play such role. Thus, despite Naccache’s conclusions 
(Naccache, 2006), the Freudian model is consistent with conflicting 
models, including the workspace model, which is theoretically a good 
match for Freud’s first topic tripartition, with one exception.
New pictures of the different kinds of unconscious converge to dis-
tinguish procedural memory from the repressed unconscious contents. 
It is noteworthy that current research insists on the structural role of 
infantile experiences. Neurobiological and inter-personal perspectives 
posit interactions between newborns and care givers (self-objects) to 
be necessary for babies to regulate their inner conflicts. The compro-
mise formation of solutions to homeostatic imbalances entailed by the 
activation of drives and their affective aftermaths may be structured 
during infancy and last for the entire life span. Shore (2009) – (for a 
critical account see Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000) has proposed the 
right hemisphere to underpin attachment as a primitive and mostly 
unconscious system: the right hemisphere is tightly connected to the 
limbic system; the right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex is supposed 
to process self-referential stimuli and to be activated in recollection 
of personally affect-laden life events (Reiman et al., 1997). Moreover, 
the right hemisphere has tentatively been identified as the location of 
empathic mirroring, fleshing out the hypothesis according to which 
7The complementarity of the Freudian approach consists in jugulating the anthro-
pomorphic aspect of the global workspace theory. A drive might impose itself in re-
ason of its qualitative function, i.e., according to the way it participates to lower the 
excitation in the system. The compromise between pleasure principle and reality 
principle, between the positive or negative somatic markers attached to the desired 
state and the factual availability of the satisfaction, brings out biologically relevant 
rules to understand how the system organizes itself.
8As Baars (1988) conceives it, repression can be seen as the flip-side of the system’s 
choosing procedure.
Arminjon The four postulates of Freudian unconscious
www.frontiersin.org June 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 125 | 11
social cognition. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 
59, 255–278.
Freud, A. (1936). The Ego and the 
Mechanisms of Defense. New York: 
International Universities Press.
Freud, S. (1915a). “Instincts and their 
vicissitudes,” in Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14, ed. J. Strachey 
(London: Hogarth Press), 111–140.
Freud, S. (1915b). “Beyond the pleasure 
principle,” in Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, Vol. 18, ed. J. Strachey 
(London: Hogarth Press), 111–140.
Freud, S. (1915c). “The unconscious,” 
in Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. 14, ed. J. Strachey (London: 
Hogarth Press), 166–215.
Freud, S. (1917). “A difficulty in the 
path of psycho-analysis,” in Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 17, ed. 
J. Strachey (London: Hogarth Press), 
135–144.
Freud, S. (1920). “Beyond the pleasure 
principle”, in Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, Vol. 18 (London: 
Hogarth Press), 1–64.
Friston, K., Kilner, J., and Harrison, L. 
(2006). A free energy principle for 
the brain. J. Physiol. Paris 100, 70–87.
Frith, C. D., Blakemore, S. J., and Wolpert, 
D. M. (2000). Abnormalities in the 
awareness andcontrol of action. Philos. 
Making of Consciousness. New York: 
Harcourt Brace.
Dehaene, S., and Naccache, L. (2001). 
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of 
consciousness: basic evidence and a 
workspace framework. Cognition 79, 
1–37.
Dennett, D. C. (1987). The Intentional 
Stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness 
Explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown 
and Company.
Desimone, R., and Duncan, J. (1995). 
Neural mechanisms of selective vis-
ual attention. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 18, 
193–222.
Draine, S. C. (1997). Analytic Limitations 
of Unconscious Language Processing. 
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 
Depar t ment  o f  Psycholog y, 
University of Washington, Seattle, 
WA.
Driver, J., and Vuilleumier, P. (2001). 
Perceptual awareness and its loss in 
unilateral neglect and extinction. 
Cognition 79, 39–88.
Dudai, Y. (2006). Reconsolidation: the 
advantage of being refocused. Curr. 
Opin. Neurobiol. 16, 174–178.
Edelman, G. (1992). Bright Air, Brilliant 
Fire. On the Matter of the Mind. New 
York: Basic Books.
Erdelyi, M. H. (2001). Defense processes 
can be conscious or unconscious. Am. 
Psychol. 56, 761–762.
Evans, J. S. (2008). Dual-processing 
accounts of reasoning, judgment and 
control of social behavior,” in The New 
Unconscious, eds R. Hassin, J. Uleman, 
and J. Bargh (New York: Oxford), 
37–58.
Brakel, L. A. W. (2004). The psychoana-
lytic assumption of the primary pro-
cess: extra psychoanalytic evidence. J. 
Am. Psychoanal. Assoc. 52, 1131–1161.
Brakel, L. A. W., Shevrin, H., and Villa, 
K. (2002). The priority of primary 
process categorizing: experimental 
evidence supporting a psychoana-
lytic developmental hypothesis. J. Am. 
Psychoanal. Assoc. 50, 483–505.
Broadbent, D. E. (1958). Perception and 
Communication. London: Pergamon 
Press.
Bucci, W. (1997). Psychoanalysis and 
Cognitive Science: A Multiple Code 
Theory. New York: Guilford Press.
Buzsaki, G. (2004). Large-scale recording 
of neuronal ensembles. Nat. Neurosci. 
7, 446–451.
Carhart-Harris, R. L., and Friston, K. J. 
(2010). The default-mode, ego-func-
tions and free-energy: a neurobiologi-
cal account of Freudian ideas. Brain 
133, 1265–1283.
Cleeremans, A. (2008). Consciousness: the 
radical plasticity thesis. Prog. Brain Res. 
168, 19–33.
Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes’ Error, 
Emotion, Reason, and the Human 
Brain. New York: A. Grosset/Putnam 
Book.
Damasio, A. (1999). The Feeling of What 
Happens: Body and Emotion in the 
reFerences
Alberini, C. M. (2005). Mechanisms of 
memory stabilization: are consolida-
tion and reconsolidation similar or 
distinct processes? Trends Neurosci. 
28, 51–56.
Allport, A. (1989). “Visual attention,” in 
Foundations of Cognitive Science, ed. 
M. I. Posner (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press), 631–682.
Anderson, M. C., and Green, C. (2001). 
Suppressing unwanted memories 
by executive control. Nature 410, 
366–369.
Ansermet, F., and Magistretti, P. J. (2007). 
Biology of Freedom: Neural Plasticity, 
Experience and the Unconscious. New 
York: Other Press.
Arminjon, M. (2010). Les intentions du 
corps, Psychanalyse, biologie et sciences 
de l’esprit. Montréal: Editions Liber, 
Collection “Voix Psychanalytiques”.
Arminjon, M., Ansermet, F., and Magistretti, 
P. J. (2010). The homeostatic psyche: 
Freudian theory and somatic markers. 
J. Physiol. 104, 272–278.
Baars, B. J. (1988). “Momentary forget-
ting as a “resetting” of a conscious 
global workspace due to competition 
between incompatible contexts,” in 
Psychodynamics and Cognition, ed. 
M. J. Horowitz (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press), 269–293.
Baddeley, A. D. (1986). Working Memory. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bargh, J. A. (2005). “Bypassing the will: 
toward demystifying the  nonconscious 
current researches appear as more Freudian than Freud was him-
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consciousness does not exert a direct control on behavior, we have 
to establish which role the serial and narrative productions of the 
conscious subject plays. Because of its specific clinical standpoint, 
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Final remark
This review calls for a last remark on the so-called opposition 
between the cognitive and Freudian unconscious. In contradiction 
with the somewhat jocular implication of Edelman’s anecdote, we 
have tried to show that there is no reason in operating a clear-cut 
distinction between the two kinds of unconscious. So far, they share 
an interest for the same cognitive processes and, in definitive, for 
the same brain9. The latter conclusion is grounded in empirical 
data, not in the Edelman’s or Monod’s subjective convictions that 
Freud was totally right or wrong. Such a position is relevant for 
psychoanalysis if it wants to put its hypotheses in line with current 
scientific works. Yet, this does not mean that psychoanalysis has to 
be dissolved or reduced into “more fundamental” approaches. On 
the contrary, the Freudian unconscious is a compound of heuristic 
hypotheses on cognition that allows emphasizing specific phenom-
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with clinic – the gap between the cognitive and Freudian unconscious 
would vanish. As the dynamic studies tensions between physic forces, 
without contravening to the law of physics, Freudian metapsychology 
might name a dynamic perspective on cognitive tensions. As such, it 
does not contravene current neurobiological knowledge, at least in 
the strict limits of the four postulates examined here.
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